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Abstract : Four major accounts of perception through a mirror are presented: two of 
them are unifier accounts (the entity one sees in the mirror is the same as the entity that gets 
reflected), and two are multiplier accounts (the entity seen is distinct from the entity that 
gets reflects: it is either a reflection, or a replica thereof). Most accounts have unwanted 
consequences, which manifest themselves by making perception through a mirror illusory 
one way or another. A unifier account is defended which reconciles metaphysical sobriety 
with epistemic un-innocence.
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Captain Hook stands before a mirror. What does he see? Hook has a 
hook in place of his right arm. But the person he sees in the mirror has a 
hook on his left arm. So it can’t be the same person. Yet common sense says 
Hook sees himself; so it must be the same person. How can the dilemma be 
resolved?
The dilemma concerns what is seen “in” a mirror. What is the content 
of perception of a subject looking at an object reflected in a mirror, or to 
keep to a more neutral expression, a subject who uses a mirror as a visual 
aid? The difficulty in the answer lies in the fact  that  mirrors,  like many 
epistemic  artefacts,  offer  mediated  access  to  reality,  and  such  mediation 
appears to leave a trace (for example, in causing us to attribute different 
properties to whatever is perceived, as occurs with the change in position of 
the Captain’s hook).
We  will  examine  some  accounts  -  not  all  will  seem  immediately 
plausible - that articulate the content of perception that occurs by means of a 
mirror. For there are various possibilities, grouped around the positions of 
unifiers  (Captain Hook is  what  is  seen)  and multipliers  (what  is  seen is 
something other than Captain Hook).
Ordinary  parlance  oscillates  between  various  possibilities.  At  one 
extreme it indicates that one sees one’s own image or own reflection in the 
mirror,  while  at  the other  it  also allows that  one looks at  oneself in  the 
mirror, in the sense that it is a real person that is seen, something in the real 
1
world rather than an image. The implied ontology is different, and in the 
case of reflections the ontology needs to be clarified. Obviously it is not 
taken  for  granted  that  expressions  faithfully  represent  intuitions,  also 
because  it  is  possible  that  here  we  are  dealing  with  a  semi-technical 
vocabulary, partially derived from optics (which uses ‘image’ in a mirror in 
a very specific sense of the term ‘image’).  Nevertheless let us register  a 
descriptive  uncertainty  to  be  investigated  by  considering  some  possible 
accounts that articulate an answer to the question of the nature of what one 
sees using a mirror. 
An orthogonal  distinction  to  that  between seeing  oneself/seeing  an 
image  is  that  of  seeing  oneself/seeing  another  person.  More  than  by 
ordinary language, here the distinction is recorded by our behaviour, which 
highlights the possibility of an identification error.
We will also try to investigate what might be the cognitive reasons 
(the  explanations  of  the  intuitions)  that  make  us  choose  one  or  another 
account of perception through mirrors.
1. The reflection theory
A first theory suggests that what is seen in the mirror is not the object 
that is reflected (Captain Hook) but a reflection of him. I don’t see Captain 
Hook but a reflection of Captain Hook, where it  is presupposed that the 
reflection is  a different item from that of which it  is the reflection.  This 
theory is in part faithful to common sense and in part distances itself from it. 
The commonsense element of the theory is the following. Let us say we see 
a reflection in the mirror in the sense that we say we see a shadow on the 
ground, separating thereby shadows as much as reflections from the objects 
of which they are shadow and reflection.1 Shadows and reflections are not 
categorically homogeneous with the things of which they are shadows and 
reflections. A tidy way to express this intuition is to say one does not see the 
object, one sees only its reflection.
The  notion  of  reflection  however  is  very  wide,  and  its  primary 
accepted meaning includes the rays of light that reside on the surfaces of 
shiny objects and in which it is not always possible to recognise the object 
that caused them.2 We limit ourselves here to the case where recognition is 
possible, so let us consider another account directly.
2. A variant: Images are seen in a mirror
People talk of seeing an image in the mirror; again in the sense where 
they mean to use the qualification to speak of a ‘mere image’. (There is also 
1 But cf. Sorensen 1999, for cases in which perception of a shadow is perception of an 
object.
2 Cf. Cavanagh 2005. It is also necessary to ask if it is possible to specify what a reflection 
is without specifying what it is a reflection of.
2
a  technical  sense  of  ‘image’,  a  paramathematical  meaning  borrowed  by 
optics, the sense of image as ‘mapping’, which will not be discussed here). 
To talk of images in a mirror, while allowing us to circumscribe those cases 
where  one  recognises something  in  the  mirror,  creates  a  further 
complication,  insofar  as  the  concept  of  image  is  associated  with  that  of 
representational content. And in practice there is a sense in which one might 
think that mirrors were vehicles of representations: a sense in which it can 
be said that the mirror  represents Captain Hook. It might be objected that 
mirrors are only “mechanisms” (loosely speaking) to reflect light, whereas 
the presence of representational content essentially must include reference 
to an intention. However, by introducing an appropriate intentional element 
one could answer the objection that sees in mirrors mere stages in the flow 
of  information insofar  as  they do not  involve intentions.  I  can have  the 
intention to use a mirror to make you see what you look like, or to show you 
what is behind you. The representational content of the mirror in that case 
would be inherited from that of the intention governing its use. Therefore a 
causal-intentional  account  of  image  does  not  yet  manage  to  exclude 
automatically  that  looking in  a  mirror  is  like  looking at  an image.3 The 
relevant difference must be found elsewhere. The countercheck of the need 
to look elsewhere for the relevant difference between images and mirrors 
comes from the fact that some images too are obtained mechanically - such 
as  photographs.  The  element  of  mechanical  production  is  therefore  not 
decisive.
One of the possible reasons for holding that actual images of things are 
what are seen in mirrors is a hypothetical analogy between the way things 
are  seen  in  a  mirror  and  the  way  images  like  pictures  or  photographs 
hanging on walls  are seen.  This analogy is supported by certain rational 
reconstructions  of  the  origins  of  painting,  and  in  particular  of  the 
representation of perspective, according to which one way for the artist to 
proceed would consist in tracing on the surface of a transparent screen (a 
3 This piece of evidence seems to motivate the arguments in U. Eco (1985) aimed at 
showing that mirrors are not semiotic phenomena.
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window) the profile of the things visible on the other side of the window.4 
However we should beware of precisely this kind of rational reconstruction.
The unfeasibility5 of the method just described is evident to anyone 
who has tried to carry it out. Parallax phenomena occur in windows that 
cannot occur in images. The smallest change in point of view causes a loss 
of alignment between the profile traced on the window and the profile of the 
thing to be represented. Indeed here lies the fundamental difference between 
images and windows. Windows do not function as images given that what is 
seen within a window changes according to adjustments of point of view, 
whereas what is seen by means of an image resists adjustments of point of 
view. But for this same reason mirrors do not function like images either, 
given  that  what  is  seen  within  a  mirror  changes  in  a  way regulated  by 
adjustments to point of view.
One can nevertheless extract from this discussion that if in need of a 
useful analogy to analyse the structure of the content of perception, mirrors 
function as windows rather than as images; and that in the case of mirrors it 
is still possible to fall back on the idea of image insofar as we are dealing 
with “windows” that show a reality that is different in some respects from 
that which exists beyond the surface of the mirror;  by contrast  with real 
windows, which in fact show the reality that exists on the other side of the 
window.  Here  we  reconnect  with  the  idea  that  mirrors  present  ‘mere’ 
images, and not reality in flesh and blood.
Up to  now we have  listed  some aspects  of  mirrors  that  may cause 
intuitions to lean towards the assimilation of the content of perception when 
looking in a mirror, to content when looking at an image. Such assimilation 
4 Leonardo da Vinci, Trattato della Pittura, 402: “How the mirror is master of painters. 
When you want to see if your painting altogether conforms with the thing portrayed in 
nature, take a mirror, and make the live thing reflect in it, and compare the thing reflected 
with your painting, and consider well whether the subject of one and the other likeness 
conform to each other. Above all the mirror is to be taken as master, I mean the flat mirror, 
inasmuch as on its surface things have similarities with paintings in many parts; that is you 
see a painting done on a plane show things that seem in relief, and a mirror on a plane does 
the same; a painting is just a surface, a mirror is the very same; a painting is intangible, 
insofar as that which is round and distinct cannot be circled with hands, and mirrors do the 
same. Mirrors and paintings show the similarity of things surrounded by shadow and light, 
and one and the other appear well beyond their surface. And if you know that a mirror 
through features and shadows and lights makes things seem to stand out for you, and your 
having among your colours shadows and light more powerful that those of the mirror, of 
course, if you know how to compose them well together, your picture too will seem itself a 
natural thing, seen in a great mirror.”
If what I argue in this paper holds, the method Leonardo proposes is perfectly unusable: 
looking at something in a mirror does not introduce substantial differences compared to 
looking at it in reality. The passage from Leonardo’s treatise should be seen therefore more 
as a theoretical reflection on mirrors and images rather than as a series of practical pointers. 
And from a theoretical point of view it articulates - presenting them as obvious - some of 
the main points of a position that as we will see is not obvious.
5 Casati 2000.
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highlights the aspect of unreality that one would like to associate with what 
is  seen  in  the  mirror,  but  obscures  certain  important  phenomenological 
aspects (in particular, as we will see in section 6, the important difference 
between the content of perception of mirrors/windows and images is given 
by  the  difference  between  the  rules  of  co  variation  of  content  with 
movement  of  observer).  We might  say that  this  assimilation is  based on 
ontological intuitions about the nature of what is seen, while its negation is 
based on phenomenological aspects.
3.  Unifiers  vs.  multipliers:  the  simple  unifier 
account
An account that envisages that what is seen in the mirror is a reflection 
or an image of Captain Hook but not Hook himself is a multiplier’s account: 
such an account multiplies the number of items relevant to the analysis of 
the  structure  of  the  content  of  perception  through  mirrors.  As  the 
supplementary entity is a reflection, call the theory a ‘reflection multiplier’ 
account.  In  opposition  to  multiplier  accounts  are  deflationary  or  unifier 
accounts. 
According  to  a  first  deflationary  theory,  it  is  not  an  image  or  a 
reflection of  the  object  that  is  seen “in the mirror”,  but  the  object  itself 
which is reflected, perhaps (but not necessarily) in the wrong place and with 
odd features. There are not two relevant items for the structure of perceptual 
content, but one.6 Call this the ‘simple unifier’ account. On this account, the 
representational content of an episode of perception where a mirror is used 
as  an intermediary is  not  substantially  different  from that  of  an episode 
where one is not used, aside from deformations incidentally introduced by 
and ascribable to the deviant causal chain.
In practice what we see in the mirror is a portion of the world: but, in 
virtue of the deviant causal chain, we represent that portion as if it were 
situated in a different place from where it is in fact located (for instance, on 
the other side of the wall in the hall where the mirror hangs, which we know 
to be the entrance to the neighbours’ apartment not ours), and possessed of 
certain different properties from those it has (for instance, Captain Hook 
should have the hook on his right arm not his left).
At first pass, the content of perception of an object reflected in a mirror 
is  therefore mistaken or illusory (in some sense that  needs to  be further 
specified) if the object has different properties from those that the content 
ascribes, as occurs normally. I see Captain Hook in the mirror. When I look 
in the mirror it seems to me that Hook is missing his left arm. But when I 
look at  Captain Hook without  using a mirror it  appears his  right  arm is 
missing.  The  content  of  normal  perception that  has  Captain Hook as  its 
6 We have registered the expression “to see X in the mirror”. A linguistic revision such as 
“to see X thanks to the mirror” captures an element of the unificatory account; as suggested 
above, it could be compatible with the expression “vedere allo specchio”.
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object and the content of perception that has as its object Captain Hook seen 
through  a  mirror  therefore  differ  systematically  in  regard  to  certain 
descriptions, those featuring the terms ‘right’ and ‘left’.
How does the simple unifier account answer the dilemma outlined at 
the beginning of the paper? The account favours one of the horns of the 
dilemma as it subscribes to the intuition that what is seen in the mirror is the 
same thing that produces the reflection. But it must then explain how it is 
possible that things seen in the mirror have different properties from those 
that are being mirrored. The way out is to consider the content of perception 
through a mirror to be  illusory. It is an illusion to have the impression of 
seeing  the  hook  on  the  Captain’s  left  arm;  it  is  an  illusion  to  have  the 
impression of seeing a space opening up before us when we look in the 
mirror.
4. The replica multiplier account
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies another multiplier account that 
aims to resolve the dilemma in a symmetrical way to that just set out: by 
denying (some aspects of) an attribution of illusion and at the same time 
denying the identity thesis. This multiplier account does not introduce items 
of a different  type with respect  to the objects  that are mirrored,  such as 
reflections or images, but introduces items of the same kind and postulates 
that they are (individual) objects distinct from those that are mirrored. The 
underlying  intuition  has  been  expressed  in  Borges’ story  about  Uqbar: 
mirrors are abominable because they increase the number of things.7 So it is 
not  Captain  Hook  I  would  see  in  the  mirror,  but  a  replica (which  by 
definition is different from Captain Hook). This position also answers the 
mirror  dilemma.  It  has  the  advantage  of  not  postulating  content  that  is 
mistaken  about  the  properties  of  the  object:  the  replica  has  exactly  the 
properties ascribed by perceptual content determined by the perception of 
the  mirror,  and  by  definition  that  content  is  not  mistaken  about  the 
properties it represents. The replica of Captain Hook is missing its left arm 
and I veridically see that it is missing its left arm. In fact, looking in the 
mirror  would  mean  casting  an  eye  over  another  possible  world.  The 
phenomenological comparison with windows returns here in another guise: 
it is as if a window had been opened in the wall the mirror is hanging on, 
revealing spaces and objects that are different from those actually on the 
other side of the wall.
But  perceptual  content  has  an  illusory aspect  as  well.  If  I  am  not 
looking at  Captain Hook but  at  a  replica of him, how do I  describe the 
behaviour - intentional or otherwise - of the replica? The replica winks. It 
does so at the same moment as Captain Hook (modulo the speed of light). 
Did the replica wink spontaneously? If we say yes, then we must consider 
7  “Then Bioy Casares recalled that one of the heresiarchs of Uqbar had declared that 
mirrors and copulation are abominable, because they increase the number or men.” J.L. 
Borges, 1940, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbius Tertius”.
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the impression that the real Captain Hook is responsible for the movement 
to be an  illusion. Of course, when looking at ourselves in the mirror, we 
would find it particularly hard to regard as an illusion the fact that what 
happens “in the mirror” is completely determined by what happens in the 
world beyond the mirror. The replica account asks us to give up the basic 
intuition that says we control our reflection in the mirror.
5. The mirror illusion
Both  the  simple  unifier  account  and  the  replica  multiplier  account 
presuppose that there is an error in perception gained through a mirror; that 
mirror perception generates some form of illusion. To say that what is seen 
through the mirror is seen as incorrectly localised and is ascribed incorrect 
properties (deflationist theory) presupposes a mistake just as much as does 
attempting  to  save  the  veracity  of  content  by  postulating  the  correct 
perception  of  a  replica  with  systematically  different  properties  from the 
object of which it is a replica. One could nevertheless object that the error 
presents  itself  only  if  we  accept  that  perception  through  a  mirror  is 
epistemically innocent, that is, produced without any awareness of the fact 
that we are dealing with mirrors. If such knowledge of the structure of the 
epistemic  channel  is  integrated  with  the  content,  that  is,  if  we  consider 
epistemic innocence a myth, then some of the descriptive elements listed 
above are overturned, and the phenomenology of looking in a mirror must 
therefore be reinterpreted. Call this the un-innocent unifier account. Looking 
in a mirror is not (normally) like looking through glass, rather it is obtaining 
information about part of the world that sends to the mirror the light that the 
observer uses to perceive the scene. Captain Hook is not seen erroneously 
on the other side of the wall on which the mirror hangs, but on the same side 
of  the  room where  the  observer  is  located;  and  he  is  seen  where  he  is 
precisely because it is known that a mirror is in use. Equally, he is not seen 
in the mirror with a hook on his left arm but with a hook on his right, that is, 
where in fact he has a hook. Note that a not indifferent advantage of this 
position is that it  allows the instantaneous resolution of discussion about 
mirrors that ‘invert right and left but not top and bottom’ (Block 1974): the 
idea  that  an  “inversion”  occurred  was  an  artefact  of  description:  only 
abstracting from the fact that the reflective properties of mirrors are known 
(feigning epistemic innocence) could one maintain one had the impression 
that the hook had moved from the right arm to the left, and that therefore 
mirrors invert right and left. It is not content that is illusory; the illusion is 
the impression of having illusory content.
6. Homework for the un-innocent unifier account: 
a sensorimotor theory of reflections
The un-innocent unifier account has on its side the generic advantages 
of ontologically parsimonious theories. Two things still need to be shown, 
however: in the first place, that multiplier accounts do not make virtuous use 
of the entities they postulate – that is, that such entities (images, reflections 
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and replicas) do not turn out to be indispensable or at least very useful in an 
account  of  the  content  of  perception  through  mirrors.  Secondly,  that 
epistemic  innocence  is  a  non-unrenounceable  feature  of  the 
phenomenological description of perceptual content.
On  the  first  point  (uselessness  of  postulated  entities)  :  We  saw  in 
section 2 how the notion of image that is appealed to when it is held that 
seeing “in” a mirror is like seeing “in” an image is a notion that is in fact 
used to stand for (at least) three elements: the paramathematical use of the 
term ‘image’ (like ‘mapping’),  the extenuating clause “only” (as in “one 
sees  only  an  image  in  the  mirror”),  and  the  fact  that  images  are 
representations. The fundamental difference between seeing in an image and 
seeing in a mirror was given by phenomenology: the robustness of what is 
seen in the image was contrasted with the transience of what is seen using a 
mirror. If I move from right to left relative to the picture of Uncle Sam, his 
threatening finger continues to point at me; but if I move to the left or right 
of an immobile Uncle Sam that I  see through a mirror, I  can escape his 
indicating gesture.
Nevertheless,  phenomenology  offers  a  hold  to  classificatory 
uncertainty. If we ideally bend a flat mirror until  it  becomes convex, we 
alter the parameters of coordination between our movements and changes in 
the visual image. The change in visual image is (relatively) minor compared 
to that which occurs when we move while looking at a flat mirror. At the 
limit, in cases of extreme convexity, the alteration is minimal: the reflections 
of  light  sources  tend  to  remain  anchored  to  the  edges  of  shiny  objects. 
Furthermore, an important “shrinkage” of reflected things can be noted in a 
convex mirror (think of the back of a spoon) compared to how they would 
be seen in a flat mirror.
This fact shows a phenomenological basis for what is seen in a mirror 
being  attributed  the  character  of  image.  We  naturally  tend  to  consider 
reflections  in  a  convex  mirror  to  be  images  insofar  as  they  effectively 
behave  like  images  (shrinkage  and  anchoring  to  the  surface).  The 
countercheck to this fact is suggested by a pin-hole camera8 (which projects 
an image through a hole onto a translucent wall). The camera stands to a 
window as a convex mirror stands to a mirror:  both the camera and the 
convex mirror tend to block the visual scene with respect to the movements 
of the observer.
On the second point (giving up epistemic innocence): Someone might 
want  to  hold  that  epistemic  un-innocence,  that  is,  the  possibility  of 
countenancing  the  structure  of  the  epistemic  channel  when looking  in  a 
mirror, is not a feature of the phenomenology. Indeed, an objector would 
maintain, mirrors can fool us in a way that betrays our epistemic innocence. 
8 I owe the suggestion that a pin-hole camera is in a sense intermediate between image and 
window to Clotilde Calabi.
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In particular in the case where they really seem to open up a space before 
us, a space in which we have the impression we can embark on an action. 
The reply to the objection is two-fold. In the first place, phenomena such as 
those  described  by  the  objector  are  marginal  and  surprising:  it  rarely 
happens that we are fooled by a mirror to the extent of taking the virtual 
space as a possible space for action - a space we would like to walk towards 
for example. Secondly, the marginality of these phenomena is tied to the fact 
that we learn to use mirrors successfully, to the point that epistemically un-
innocent use of mirrors becomes second nature. In fact, we learn to ignore 
the space on the other side of the mirror; we learn to use rear-view mirrors 
(in right-driving countries, looking in the mirror, the car behind us does not 
seem to have the steering wheel on the right). This is also why attempts to 
‘stretch space’ by putting big mirrors in narrow houses are made in vain. 
After a short while one becomes used to ignoring the ‘virtual spaces’ created 
by the mirrors. And for this reason we are surprised by simple tricks like 
illuminating something on the other side of a mirror by pointing a torch 
beam: for we do not normally consider the virtual space as accessible to 
action.
The un-innocent unifier account that embraces epistemic innocence at 
the  phenomenological  level  is  therefore  the  best  candidate  to  solve  the 
dilemma of Captain Hook. It solves it by denying one of the horns of the 
dilemma (we do not see the hook on the left arm of the Captain, but on the 
right arm, that is, where the Captain actually has a hook, by contrast with 
what is predicted by the simple unifier account), and accepting the other: 
what is seen in the mirror really is Captain Hook, as opposed to what the 
multiplier  account  predicts;  we  see  neither  a  replica  of  him,  nor  his 
reflection, as against the predictions of the reflection and replica multiplier 
accounts respectively.
7. Morals
Some morals can be drawn from this discussion.
A. A first moral invites caution in the use of the terminology adopted to 
discuss ‘virtual reality’. After all, mirrors provide an example of low-tech 
virtual reality.9 In the case of mirrors, the ‘virtuality’ of what is seen through 
a mirror is nothing more than a turn of phrase to underline the fact that we 
are in the presence of a non-canonical way of collecting information about 
the world;  but  what  is  seen is  the world itself,  and the individuals  who 
inhabit it.
B.  A second  moral  concerns  sensory-motor  accounts  of  perception, 
which hypothesise that the content of perception is a function of knowledge 
of  the  type  of  movement  which  the  perceiver  can  carry  out  in  certain 
9 Cf. Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998 for terminology. Note that Ramachandran’s 
experiments use mirrors (which in this case offer a partial view) presupposing epistemic 
innocence.
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contexts; even if there is now a consensus around a certain scepticism about 
their claim to be candidates for a general theory of perception (Block 2005), 
the intuition that guides them can be saved, at least locally. Sensory-motor 
principles  work  at  the  level  of  content  to  distinguish  some  contents  of 
perception  from  others;  in  particular,  here  they  have  been  useful  to 
distinguish perception through a flat  mirror and a  convex mirror,  and to 
show how the latter can be a step towards our notion of perception through 
an image.
C. A third moral concerns the use of notions such as image, which have 
a double life, both as ingredients of common sense and as elements of one 
or another account used to describe the world. Not to distinguish between 
the various meanings is to risk creating hybrid accounts that do not allow 
the  correct  classification  of  the  phenomena  to  be  described;  and  a 
descriptively  inadequate  theory  has  few  chances  of  being  explanatorily 
adequate.10
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